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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Even if the courts apply a discriminating set of standards in 10(j)
injunction cases, there is no assurance that the Board will seek those
injunctions. 64 Though more have been granted than have been denied,
it is difficult to argue on such evidence alone that too many have issued
because compared with the total number of eligible violations so few
have been sought. The infrequency of use of section 10(j) is no rea-
son to sanction the existence of arbitrary power whether or not it is
exercised, nor is it an adequate excuse for the lack of predictability
which plagues this section of the Act. Although the Board is held only
to a loose standard of prosecutorial discretion in whether to take any
action, that standard excludes the unreasonable and the arbitrary.0 5
It is the office of a legal system to make it ostensibly, as well as fac-
tually certain that governmental power is properly exercised.
PHYSICAL INJURY AND THE MISREPRESENTATION
EXCEPTION OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT, § 2680(h)
Plaintiff, operating a dragline' while improving the channel of a
small creek, struck and detonated a natural gas pipeline which was
shown on Government site plans2 to be located outside the work area.
involves the shutdown of important business operations which, because of their
special nature, would have an extraordinary impact on the public interest; (3)
whether the alleged unfair labor practices involve an unusually wide geogrphic
area, thus creating special problems of public concern; (4) whether the unfair
labor practices create special remedy problems so that it would probably be
impossible either to restore the status quo or effectively to dissipate the conse-
quences of the unfair labor practices through resort solely to the regular procedures
provided in the Act for Board order and subsequent enforcement proceedings;
(5) whether the unfair labor practices involve interference with the conduct of
an election or constitute a flagrant disregard of a Board certification of a bargain-
ing representative or other Board procedures; (6) whether the continuation of the
alleged unfair labor practice will result in exceptional hardship to the charging
party; (7) whether the current unfair labor practice is of a continuing or
repetitious pattern; (8) whether, if violence is involved, the violence is of such
a nature as to be out of control of local authorities or otherwise widespread and
susceptible of control by 10(j) relief.
There is no reason why standards used in 10(l) cases to date could not be applied
to the 10(j) situation if the relationship is kept clear.
" See, e.g., Bandlow v. Rothman, 278 F.2d 866 (D.D.C. 1960) ; Hourihan v. NLRB,
201 F.2d 187 (D.D.C.), cert. denied 345 U.S. 930 (1953).
'Office Employee's International Union v. Labor Board, 353 U.S. 313 (1957);
Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952).
"'An excavating machine in which the bucket is attached only by cables and is
drawn toward the machine during the filling operation ... " WEBSTER, TEUR NEW
INT'L DICTIONARY (1961).
2 Plans were furnished by the United States Department of Agriculture, Soil Con.
servation Service.
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Plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act 3 to
recover for his personal injuries. Defendant moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, contending
that the case was bottomed on misrepresentation and therefore ex-
cluded from the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2680(h).'
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Missis-
sippi granted Defendant's motion to dismiss. Held: the action for
personal injury was one "arising out of misrepresentation" within the
Federal Tort Claims Act exclusion, 28 U.S.C. section 2680(h).
Vaughn v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 was enacted to waive federal
tort immunity.' The Government is made liable to an individual for
tortious conduct of its employees while acting within the scope of their
employment.' The waiver of immunity is subject to several express
exceptions including "any claim arising out of... misrepresentation
[and] deceit .... 117 While the scheme of the statute and its legislative
history seem to indicate that only intentional torts were to be excepted,
a number of cases have held that the exception must include negligent
as well as willful misrepresentation if both terms are to be given mean-
ing.' If a negligent act is accompanied by misrepresentation upon
which plaintiff has relied, courts disallow recovery on the theory that
without misrepresentation there would be no loss from the negligent
act.' The principal case mechanically applies this theory to a suit
- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1964).
'28 U.S.C. § 2680. "Exceptions. The provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to... (h) any claim arising out of assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." (Emphasis
added.)
'See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17, 24-25 (1953). See also Gilroy v.
United States, 112 F. Supp. 664, 665-66 (D.D.C. 1953) in which the court said:
The purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act was to abrogate the immunity of
the United States against suit in tort. Its purpose was to make the United States
liable to suit in tort in the same manner as anyone else.
For a survey of the Act, see generally Gottlieb, Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statu-
tory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L.J. 1 (1946); 14 VAND. L. REv. 653 (1961); Annot.,
1 A.L.R.2d 222 (1948).
028 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2674 (1964).
728 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1964).
"A long line of cases has affirmed the reasoning which was first expressed in
Jones v. United States, 207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 921 (1954).
See, e.g., United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961); Hall v. United States, 274
F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Miller Harness Co. v. United States, 241 F.2d 781 (2d Cir.
1957); Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.
N.Y. 1956), affd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957); National Mfg. Co. v. United States,
210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954) ; Clark v. United States,
218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954).
'See cases cited in notes 10 and 11 infra.
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involving physical injuries in a manner which could severely limit the
scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The court in the principal case reviewed and adopted the rationale
of an unbroken line of decisions which held that "misrepresentation"
within the meaning of section 2680(h) encompasses negligent mis-
representation. The theory of the complaint was negligent misrepre-
sentation. Since the exception for misrepresentation was not limited to
commercial or financial transactions, but had been extended to prop-
erty destruction ° and wrongful death actions," the complaint was dis-
missed.
Courts have uniformly held that the misrepresentation exception of
section 2680(h) includes willful and negligent misrepresentation in
cases involving economic loss. 2 The exception was first construed in
Jones v. United States,"3 in which plaintiff was denied recovery for lost
profits. The court held that since " 'deceit' means fraudulent mis-
representation, 'misrepresentation' must have been meant to include
negligent misrepresentation, since otherwise the word 'misrepresenta-
tion' would be duplicative." 4
The reasoning of Jones, holding misrepresentation to comprehend
negligent misrepresentation, is questionable. Legislative history in-
dicates only intentional torts were to be excepted.' The wisdom of
" Clark v. United States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954); National Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954). See notes
36 and 37 infra and accompanying text.
"Bartie v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 754
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 852 (1964).
"See, e.g., United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961); Jones v. United States,
207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 921 (1954); Bartie v. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 852 (1964).
'207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 921 (1954). Plaintiff was
denied recovery for lost profit on the sale of securities because of alleged negligent
misrepresentation by the government as to the estimated oil producing capacity of
realty.
"Id. at 564 (footnote omitted).
S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946):
This section (2680) specifies types of claims which would not be covered by the
title... claims which relate to certain governmental activities which should be
free from the threat of damage suit, or for which adequate remedies are already
available. These exemptions cover claims arising out of... deliberate torts such
as assault and battery....
The House Report concerning a nearly identical bill contains similar language.
H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945).
The torts excluded in § 2680(h) have been described as "deliberate torts, well-estab-
lished in the common law." Gottlieb, supra note 5, at 49.
The limits and exceptions of the Federal Tort Claims Act have been fully explored.
See generally Gottlieb, mnpra note 5; Gellhorn & Schenk, Tort Actions Against the
Federal Government, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 722 (1947); Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Lia-
bility for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1325 (1954); Note, The
Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947).
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excluding liability for deliberate torts is suspect, The statutory
scheme allows recovery for negligent torts, 7 and the ten other excep-
tions in section 2680(h) are typically characterized as intentional
torts."' Since section 1346 (b) requires application of state law to
determine liability and since the definitions of misrepresentation and
deceit are not uniform, 9 both terms may have been used to prevent
loopholes.2"
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Neustadt,2 ' approved the
line of cases which held that the misrepresentation exception of
2680(h) disallows actions based upon negligent misrepresentation
where economic or property losses are alleged. In footnote 26 of its
opinion the Court indicated that not every act or omission is mis-
representation within section 2680(h). In its generic sense, misrepresen-
tation is confined "very largely to the invasion of interests of a financial
or commercial character in the course of business dealings."23 (Em-
"
0The concept of respondeat superior outside the governmental field generally holds
the master liable for the willful acts of his employees. No sound reason has been
advanced to limit it in the governmental sphere. James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL.
L. REV. 161, 187 (1954); Lambert & Rheingold, Comments on Recent Important Per-
sonal Injury (Tort) Cases, 28 NACCA L.J. 62, 77 (1962) ; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
TORTS §29.13 (1956).
1728 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1964).
"A list of the excepted torts appears at note 4 supra. But for misrepresentation
the above listed exceptions are generally recognized as intentional torts.
"'The definitions of misrepresentation and deceit vary with the jurisdiction. See
generally 50 Ky. L.J. 244 (1961); 75 HARV. L. REV. 216-17 (1961).
The confusion as to the distinctions and meanings of deceit and misrepresentation
are brought to focus in the heated debate of Professors Bohlen and Green. Bohlen,
Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARv. L. REv. 733 (1929) ;
Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REv. 749 (1930) ; Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresenta-
tions Be Treated as Negligence or Fraud?, 18 VA. L. REv. 703 (1932) ; Green, Inno-
cent Misrepresentation, 19 VA. L. REv. 242 (1933).
'In §2680(h), quoted in note 4 supra, besides misrepresentation and deceit, the
terms false arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and abuse of process
appear. The use of such similar terms is often a legislative device to prevent loop-
holes in a statute because of variations in the meaning of legal phrases in different
jurisdictions. This is particularly compelling here since § 2674 of the act requires
application of state law to determine liability for torts actionable under the act.
366 U.S. 696 (1961). In reversing United States v. Neustadt, 281 F.2d 596 (4th
Cir. 1960), which had allowed recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act to a pur-
chaser of a home who had been furnished a statement, made at the request of the seller,
reporting the results of a negligently inaccurate appraisal by the Federal Housing
Administration, the Court held the claim was one "arising out of . . . misrepresenta-
tion."
'The Neustadt opinion has been widely criticized. Sound alternative reasoning
has been suggested. See, e.g., 75 HARV. L. REv. 216 (1961) ; 50 Ky. L. J. 244 (1961);
47 VA. L. REv. 139 (1961); 14 VAND. L. REv. 653 (1961).
This note attempts to establish that, regardless of the validity of Neustadt as a
general rule in commercial misrepresentation, its rationale is inappropriate when
dealing with personal injury actions.
' In its entirety note 26 at 711 reads as follows:
Our conclusion neither conflicts with nor impairs the authority of Indian Tow-
ing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) which held cognizable a Torts Act
1967]
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phasis added.) Some courts in apparent disregard of this limitation
have applied Neustadt to every situation where any form of mis-
representation appears.
The Fourth Circuit in Neustadt had allowed recovery on the theory
that where the government is to perform acts and provide information
it has two duties: (1) a duty to perform the act with care, and (2) a
duty to communicate correctly the results of that act. The funda-
mental cause of Neustadt's loss was breach of the duty to perform the
act with care, not negligence in transmission of the information. The
Supreme Court rejected this analysis:24
To say.., that a claim arises out of "negligence," rather than "misrepre-
sentation," when the loss suffered by the injured party is caused by the
breach of a "specific duty" owed by the Government to him, i.e., the
duty to use due care in obtaining and communicating information upon
which that party may reasonably be expected to rely in the conduct of his
economic affairs, is only to state the traditional and commonly under-
stood legal definition of the tort of "negligent misrepresentation,"....
(Emphasis added.)
Cases which have arisen under the Federal Tort Claims Act since
Neustadt, in which elements of misrepresentation and negligence were
present, fall into three categories.
Cases alleging economic or financial loss have been uniformly dis-
missed25 as outside the scope of the Act as interpreted by Neustadt.
The rational is that if an act of negligence is coupled with misrepresen-
tation upon which plaintiff relies, the resulting loss is caused by mis-
representation within section 2680 (h).
Cases alleging property losses are not uniform. In Indian Towing
claim for property damages suffered when a vessel ran aground as a result of the
Coast Guard's allegedly negligent failure to maintain the beacon lamp in a light-
house. Such a claim does not "arise out of... misrepresentation," any more than
does one based upon a motor vehicle operator's negligence in giving a mislead-
ing turn signal. As Dean Prosser has observed, many familiar forms of negli-
gent conduct may be said to involve an element of "misrepresentation," in the
generic sense of that word, but "[s]o far as misrepresentation has been treated as
giving rise in and of itself to a distinct cause of action in tort, it has been iden-
tified with the common law action of deceit," and has been confined "very largely
to the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial character in the course
of business dealings." (Citation omitted.)
2 1d. at 706.
'See, e.g., United States v. Croft-Mullins Elec. Co., 333 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 968 (1965) (action by a government contractor for misrepresen-
tation as to the delivery dates of materials); Smith v. United States, 333 F.2d 70
(10th Cir. 1964) (financial losses sustained where circulars induced plaintiffs to
enter reclamation project land); Goddard v. District of Columbia Redev. Land
Agency, 287 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 910 (1961) (losses by prop-
[ VOL. 42 :1107
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Co. v. United States," decided before Neustadt, recovery was allowed
for damage to a ship and its cargo because of an inoperative light-
house. Although the misrepresentation exception was not discussed in
the Indian Towing case, the Court noted that its opinion in Neustadt
did not conflict with or impair Indian Towing." Similarly, a plaintiff
recovered when his ship was damaged by a lost maritime aid which the
Coast Guard had assured mariners was not a danger to navigation.2"
The court held that "since his defense [misrepresentation], though
valid and successful in part, does not pierce the negligent acts com-
plained of, said defense is ineffective as a bar to recovery. ' 29
Cases in which the alleged negligent act led to personal injury and
in which misrepresentation was present are far from uniform in de-
cision or analysis. Some recent cases allow recovery if misrepresenta-
tion does not constitute the gist of the case, since section 2680(h)
requires that the claim "arise out of... misrepresentation." United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener30 involved the midair collision of a military
aircraft and a commercial airliner, which was flying within a regularly
traveled air route. The Government's defense under section 2680(h)
was denied because,31
[T]his section applies to claims arising out of misrepresentation. [cita-
tion to Neustadt] Here, the gravament of the action is not misrepresen-
tation but the negligent performance of operational tasks, although such
negligence consisted partly of a failure of a duty to warn. (Emphasis
added.)
In Wenninger v. United States,3 2 it was alleged that decedent was
erty owners when government carried out condemnation proceeding in negligent
manner); United States v. Lawrence Towers, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. N.Y.
1964) (losses by mechanic's lien holder against government where it insured the loan) ;
Steinmasel v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 335 (D.S.D. 1962) (veteran barred where
there was negligent dissemination of information as to educational benefits) ; O'Donnell
v. United States, 166 Ct. Cf. 107 (1964) (losses when plaintiff was asured that a ship-
ment of potatoes would meet Sweden's import standards); Feffer & Sons v. United
States, 166 Ct. Cl. 506 (1964) (losses caused by incorrect information as to amount of
heat cottonseed could withstand) ; McCreery v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 484 (1963)
(erroneous information given plaintiff as to time within which he could file for
pension).
z 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
"
7Sce note 23 supra where the passage is quoted.
Otness v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 647 (D. Alaska 1959).
Id. at 652.
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). Among the plaintiff's
allegations was that the Government was negligent in failing in its duty to warn of
unauthorized aircraft in the air corridor.
31 Id. at 398.
234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965).
The case, dismissed for plaintiff's failure to establish proximate cause, involved a
flying accident when plaintiff's plane exploded due to vortex turbulence of a military
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killed and his plane destroyed when the government negligently failed
to warn private pilots of Air Force activity around an airport. The
Government's defense based upon section 2680(h) was denied.
In cases involving negligent medical diagnoses, courts appear to
follow the distinction drawn by Neustadt between economic loss and
physical injury. Recovery is allowed for the latter notwithstanding
the element of misrepresentation. 3 In these cases, a breach of duty is
implicit in the nature of the action.
The court in the principal case should have denied the motion to
dismiss. Neustadt, impliedly, if not explicitly, limits the misrepresen-
tation exception "to invasions of an economicor financial nature."
Wiener and Wenninger are consistent with footnote 26 of Neustadt.
Both state that failure to warn of an existing danger is not the type of
misrepresentation section 2680(h) is intended to cover. The mal-
practice cases cited are consistent with this analysis.
The court in the principal case reasoned that Neustadt foreclosed
any use of duty analysis. The Neustadt exception in its view was ex-
tended to losses other than those of a commercial or financial nature.
The court relied on National Mfg. Co. v. United States,4 Clark v.
transport. In rejecting the Government's assertion of § 2680(h) as a defense, the court
stated at 505,
A failure to warn . . . is in a sense an implicit assertion that there is no danger.
For some purposes, at least, this may be properly characterized as a misrepresen-
tation. This is not the type of misrepresentation, however, that § 2680(h) was
intended to cover. This is made clear by the comments in United States v. Neu-
stadt, 366 U.S. 696, 711 n.26....
Prior to Neustadt, if an allegedly negligent medical diagnosis led to an aggra-
vated condition, the courts upheld a defense under § 2680(h) on the theory that the
misrepresentation caused the damage. In Kilduff v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 310
(E.D. Va. 1960) (suit by an ex-serviceman for damages for failure of the government
to disclose the results of his physical examination barred by § 2680(h)). The court
stated, id. at 314: "The very spirit and intent of these exceptive provisions . . . are
violated if the maintenance of an action is in any degree whatsoever dependent upon
the assertion of fraud." Hungerford v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal.
1961) (claim against government for unnecessary continuation of "blackouts" (gen-
eral effects of brain injury) as result of negligent diagnosis arose out of negligent
misrepresentation).
In Beech v. United States, 345 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1965), decided after Neustadt,
recovery was allowed for a negligent diagnosis. Plaintiff had slipped on a freshly
waxed hospital floor and was released after diagnosis incorrectly revealed no injury.
The court held that the misrepresentation exception was not a bar to recovery since
the government was liable to render proper care for plaintiff's treatment and this was
not covered by § 2680(h).
Significantly, two other cases allow recovery for an incorrect diagnosis without a
discussion of the possible limitation imposed by § 2680(h). Jackson v. United
States, 182 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1960) (§ 2680(h) could have been asserted as a
defense when surgical needle left in plaintiff's abdomen during surgery was discov-
ered but plaintiff not informed). United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1958)
(§2680(h) not asserted where physician's diagnosis failed to reveal tuberculosis).
3'210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954). Plaintiff's business
premises were inundated by flood water when Government employees disseminated
[ VoL. 42:1107
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United States,35 and Bartie v. United States.30 National Manufac-
turing and Clark involved broadcast warnings of flood conditions.37
There is an established prohibition of federal liability for damage by
flood or flood water. 8 The losses in each case were to commercial
property. Although both cases are cited in Neustadt to support the
proposition that misrepresentation includes negligent misrepresenta-
tion, the decisions appear inconsistent with the latter portions of
Neustadt and particularly footnote 26. Bartie v. United States39
involved death by flood. A recent case has indicated that reliance on
section 2680(h) in Bartie was inconsistent with Neustadt4 0
In the principal case the court applied the rule of Neustadt and the
cases it affirmed to demonstrate that framing the complaint in terms of
"the negligent breach of a duty to warn of the existence of a dangerous
condition ' 41 would not take it out of the misrepresentation exception.
This construction totally ignores portions of Neustadt 2 and later
misinformation as to flooding on the Kansas River. The court found this to be negli-
gent misrepresentation within § 2680(h).
' 218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954). Plaintiffs sued to recover for damage to personality
as a result of the Columbia River breaking through an embankment protecting the
city of Vanport. The court held that the assurances, although possibly negligent, were
within the misrepresentation exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
216 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 326 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 852 (1964). Plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of his wife
and children as a result of alleged negligent dissemination of information as to an
approaching hurricane. The court stated, 216 F. Supp. at 21: "The jurisprudence is
uniform that a complaint pegged on negligent misrepresentation does not state a
cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act."
='These cases involve either the failure to warn or an incorrect warning as to
weather conditions over which the Government neither exercises control nor could
control. These were warnings about dangers created not by the United States but by
nature.
Considerations of unlimited numbers of claimants, large dollar recoveries, and
responsibility where only a general warning was issued do not confront a court in
the Vaughn situation where a contract and a single injured plaintiff is involved.
Flood Control Act § 3, 45 Stat. 535 (1928), 33 U.S.C. § 702 (c) (1964).
In a per curiam decision affirming 216 F. Supp. 10 (W.D. La. 1963), the circuit
court, 326 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1964), stated:
Findings that the defendant was not negligent, and that the deaths of plaintiff's
wife and children were not proximately caused by the conduct of defendant's em-
ployees, are not clearly erroneous...
It is unnecessary to pass on the other grounds given by the trial court in sup-
port of his judgment. (Emphasis added.)
'°Wenninger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499, 505 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd per
curiam, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965).
" Vaughn v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 286, 287 (N.D. Miss. 1966). Plaintiff
appears to have framed his complaint in light of United Air Lines v. Weiner, 335
F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), Wenninger v. United States,
234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965), and
Brown v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Fla. 1961). This was an attempt to
withstand the Government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted under the line of cases beginning with Jones v. United
States, 207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 921 (1954), and affirmed by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).2 The court seems to have overlooked the latter portions of Neustadt and note 26
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cases.43 Cases cited to support the principal decision involve warnings
to the populace about phenomenon over which the government has no
controlP4 or damages for loss of profit.4 1 Vaughn, however, involves
bodily injury as a result of information provided pursuant to a con-
tract. The Government should not be able to relieve itself of duty
owed to a plaintiff by negligently misrepresenting that the duty has
been accurately performed.
If the Vaughn case is considered as within the footnote 26 exception
to Neustadt, the duty analysis in Wiener and Wenninger becomes an
appropriate ground for affording relief to the plaintiff. The existence
of a duty to warn of a condition of danger must be determined on the
Vaughn facts. In such a determination, the social cost" of allowing
of that opinion which limits the application of the misrepresentation exception to
cases involving "economic affairs." See note 21 mipra and accompanying text.
' United Air Lines v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
951 (1964) ; Wenninger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd per
curiam, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965).
In Brown v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. Fla. 1961), the court denied a
motion to dismiss based upon misrepresentation where a junk yards employee's claim
for injuries was sustained because of the Government's negligence in failing to
remove explosives from bomb casings or failing to warn the employer or plaintiff
that the casings were not deactivated. The court said, id. at 693: "Here plaintiff's
cause of action is based on negligence. He was not a party to any contract entered
into with the United States. There was no representation made to plaintiff by the
United States as to deactivation of the bomb casings."
The Brown opinion relied heavily on United States v. Neustadt, 281 F.2d 598 (4th
Cir. 1960), which was reversed by United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the opinion remains valid in light of note 26 of the
latter Neustadt case.
"Flood and weather prediction is an imprecise science. See note 36 Mrpra. Locat-
ing the exact position of a pipeline is a task the Government can perform accurately.
While placing the cost of negligence on the Government in the former case may not
improve predictability it should be effective in the latter case to insure accuracy.
These considerations distinguish the social cost issue of weather warnings and
inaccurate information regarding the location of pipelines. See note 46 ifra and
accompanying text as to allocation of social costs.
'The cases cited by the court to support its decision involve: (1) improper
weather warnings with losses of property and life, Bartie v. United State, 216 F.
Supp. 10 (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd per curiamn, 326 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 852 (1964), National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert.
347 U.S. 967 (1954), Clark v. United States, 218 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1954);
(2) reliance on statements made to the general public, Smith v. United States, 333
F.2d 70 (10th Cir. 1964); (3) contract between plaintiff and the United States and
plaintiff sued for economic loss, Miller Harness Co. v. United States, 241 F.2d 781 (2d
Cir. 1957); (4) tests negligently performed for individuals which lead to economic
loss, United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961), Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d
69 (10th Cir. 1959), Jones v. United States, 207 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 921 (1954), Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 144 F. Supp.
635 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1957); (5) statements made to
individuals regarding financial matters, Steinmasel v. United States, 202 F. Supp.
335 (D.S.D. 1962).
"Where the ultimate cost of such accidents will lie depends in part on the local
workman's compensation statutory system, and on whether the state could subrogate
itself against the government if the main action were allowed.
In Mississippi an injured employee may seek recovery under the act and con-
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the government to negligently cause foreseeable personal injury must
be a factor given great weight. The duty analysis allows conscious
evaluation of issues which the court in the principal case could not
reach. It is therefore superior to an uncritical application of Neustadt
to personal injury case far removed from the facts of Neustadt.
Misrepresentation cuts across the entire field of torts." In nearly
every negligence action an element of misrepresentation is present.
The essential element is still negligence, not misrepresentation." Ac-
ceptance of Vaughn would necessitate Congressional redefinition of
"misrepresentation" under section 2680(h) of the Act. If Vaughn
stands the Government can defeat at will most claims based on negli-
gence.
currently proceed against a third party tortfeasor. M.C.A. § 6998-05 (1952) provides
that recourse to the Act is the exclusive remedy for the employee against an em-
ployer who meets the requirements of the act. However, §6998-36 (1952) provides
that "acceptance of compensation benefits from or the making of a claim ... against
an employer or insurer... shall not affect the right of the employee... to sue any
other party.. .. "
The insurer remains liable for any amount by which a recovery against a third
person falls short of the prescribed compensation, but double recovery is not per-
mitted. M.C.A. § 6998-36 (1952) provides when a beneficiary of the Act brings an
action against a third party for his injuries and the insurer joins in, (1) the amount
recovered from the third party shall be applied to costs of collection of the judgment
as approved by the courts, (2) the remainder shall be used to discharge the legal
liability of the employer or insurer, and (3) any excess shall belong to the injured
employee or his dependents. See Powe v. Jackson, 236 Miss. 11, 109 So. 2d 546, 551
(1959) ; Richardson v. United States Fidelity Guar. Co., 233 Miss. 375, 102 So. 2d
368 (1958).
Most jurisdictions allow the injured employee and the insurer to sue a third party
tortfeasor other than the employer, in order to reach the ultimate wrongdoer. Sim-
ilarly amounts paid to the injured party by the insurer are recoverable if successful
against a third wrongdoer in order to avoid a windfall to the injured in the form
of a double recovery. See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMAI'S COMPENSATION
§ 71 (1961).
Allocation of these social costs should attempt to assign the cost to those in whose
power the prevention of injuries lies.
"Misrepresentation, although giving rise to a cause of action itself, more often
appears as an element of battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emo-
tional injuries, defamation or any of the numerous other categories of tortious acts.
See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 100 (3d ed. 1964) ; 48 GEo. L. J. 778, 780
(1960).
" See. e.g., Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42
HARV. L. REv. 773 (1929).
Recent commentators have generally been of the view that where a specific duty is
owed to the plaintiff, recovery should not be denied because of the existence of an
element of misrepresentation. 50 Ky. L.J. 244 (1961); 48 GEo. L.J. 778 (1960);
7 VAND. L. REv. 283 (1954).
